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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

FIRST EQUITY CORPORATION,
a Florida corporation,
PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY,
a body politic and corporate,

CASE NO. 13798

DefendantRespondent,
and
DONALD A, CATRON, an
individual,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

I

NATURE OF THE CASE

I

This is a suit by a stockbroker, First Equity Corporation
of Florida ("First Equity") against two defendants, Utah State
University ("USU") and Donald A. Catron ("Catron"), USU's

I

former investment officer, to recover damages allegedly suffered
when First Equity accepted five orders to purchase stock placed
with it by Catron without USU's authority and despite the opinion

H

of the Utah Attorney General that USU had no statutory power
to purchase stock; and then failed to deliver two of the orders
within 3 5 days from the date of purchase (trade date).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After conducting discovery, including a deposition
of Catron, First Equity moved for summary judgment against USU
only.

USU then filed a cross motion for summary judgment based

solely on its affirmative defense that the orders for the purchase of stock which Catron placed on behalf of USU were ultra
vires in that USU had no power to purchase stock; and, therefore, USU had no obligation to pay for the stock or any
commissions.

The Court denied First Equity's motion and granted

USU's cross motion.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
First Equity seeks reversal of the order denying its
motion and a reversal of the order granting USU's cross motion.
The amici seek the same relief but curiously also ask that the
case be remanded for further proceedings.

USU asks that both

orders be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Rule 75 (p) (2) Statement.

First Equity and the amici brokers have set forth in
their briefs separate statements of facts.

-2-

In compliance with

Rule 75(p)(2)' , USU indicates below to what extent appellant's
statement is inconsistent with the facts.

USU also indicates

below the extent to which the statement of facts of the amici
brokers is erroneous.
3
1.

USU agrees in all material respects

with that

portion of First Equity's statement of facts designated by it
as #1 and appearing on pages 2-4 of appellant's brief.
2.

USU agrees with all of that portion of First

Equity's statement of facts designated as #2 and appearing on
pages 4-7 of appellant's brief as far as it goes, except the
full paragraph appearing on page 5 thereof.

With respect

to that paragraph:
(a) it is incorrect to say that the decision by USU
to open an account with a stockbroker was "generally transmitted by telephone to the broker."

The record is silent as to

how such a decision was generally transmitted to a broker.

Which states in relevant part: "If the respondent
agrees with the statement of facts set forth in appellant's
brief, he shall so indicate. If he controverts it, he shall
state wherein such statement is inconsistent with the facts and
shall make a statement of the facts as he finds them. . . . "
2
The statement of facts of the amici brokers largely
parallels that of First Equity.
3
USU notes, however, that the "policy" adopted by its
institutional council on June 26, 1971, is dissimilar from the
four resolutions authorizing Catron to purchase stock in that
the latter were directed to brokers, whereas the policy statement was not.

(b)

It is incorrect to say that Catron "discussed his

authority over the telephone with the broker and [Catron] considered it a 'mechanical1 matter to send the [corporate
resolution dated January 20,,1972]."

The record shows Catron's

testimony in this regard to be far from certain (Deposition of
Catron, pp. 74-75).
Moreover, the question of whether First Equity saw a copy
of the corporate resolution dated January 20, 1972, or learned
of its contents is rendered more uncertain by the fact that
First Equity admitted it could not find in its files a copy
of said resolution and admitted that at no time did Catron
advise it that his authority to purchase stock remained effective
until written notice of the revocation of that authority was
delivered to it (Record, pages 266, 300). Catron himself
could not specifically remember sending a copy of the resolution
to First Equity (D. 75-77, 83), and the files of USU reflect
no correspondence from First Equity requesting confirmation
of Catron's authority in writing and no correspondence from
USU to First Equity suggesting that such authorization was
sent.

Indeed, the files contained no correspondence at all

between USU and First Equity (R. 303).
3.

USU agrees with that portion of First Equityfs

statement of facts designated as #3 as far as it goes.

Catron

ordered stock through First Equity for several reasons, one

-4-

of which admittedly was that First Equity was slow in delivering
certificates; but the initial reason Catron used First Equity
was that it could give investment advice on certain promising
Florida-based securities which advice Catron wanted to
receive (D. 118-119, 219-220).
4.

USU disagrees with most of the portion of First

Equity's statement of facts 'designated as #4 in its brief.
USU never informed First Equity that it "would not accept
delivery with respect to all five orders on the grounds that
Catron was not authorized to purchase securities on behalf
of USU."

Rather, with respect to the orders for Natomas,

Cordura, and Great Basin Petroleum, USU was initially advised that First Equity was willing to cancel those three
orders (R. 342-343).

Later USU was advised that First Equity

was also willing to cancel a fourth order, that of Panelrama
(R. 332) .

USU only refused payment for the fifth order, that

of Advanced Memory Systems ("AMS"), and stated as its grounds,
inter alia, that Catron had no authority to buy any stock and
that First Equity had not tendered delivery of the AMS within
35 days from the trade date (R. 330-331).
5.

USU disagrees with much of that portion of First

Equity's statement of facts designated as #5 and appearing on
pp. 8-10 of its brief.

First, there was nothing "secret" about

the termination by USU of Catron's authority to purchase stock.

-5-

That,termination was acccmplished at a meeting of the Investment
Committee of USU's Institutional Council and was reflected
in the minutes of that meeting (R. 317). Further, the fact
of Catron's termination was noted in a special meeting of
the USU Institutional Council on January 10, 1973, and reflected in the minutes of that meeting.

Meetings of the

Institutional Council are open to the public, and minutes
of those meetings become matters of public record.

Finally,

Catron's authority from USU to purchase stock was drawn into
question by the wide publicity given to the opinion of the
Attorney General dated December 15, 1972, which publicity was
to the effect that USU had no power to purchase stock (R.
326-328, 337-340, 353-356).
It is also inaccurate to suggest that the January 20,
1972, corporate resolution adopted by USU's Institutional
Council gave Catron authority which vis a vis First Equity
was to remain in effect until written notice was delivered
to First Equity.

No matter how the resolution was worded,

it could not have created any rights in First Equity if its
contents were not communicated to First Equity.
serious doubts exist

As noted above,

as to whether this was done.

First Equity's statement that it received no notice of
revocation of Catron's authority until March 19, 1973, is a
self-serving conclusion of law.

USU contends that First Equity

received notice of Catron's revocation no later than December,
1972, through its agents —

the managers of the two Logan

banks used as collecting banks by First Equity —

reading

the newspaper articles which reported that USU had no power
to purchase stock (R. 326-328, 337-340, 353-356).
While USU f s money was used to pay for stock ordered
by Catron through First Equity after December 22, 1972, no
member of the USU Administration or of the Investment
Committee of the USU institutional Council knew that Catron
was continuing to purchase stock through First Equity or indeed knew of the existence of First Equity until long after .
the money had been paid.

The only employees of USU who knew that

Catron was ordering stock through First Equity were a few of
Catron's subordinates (R. 311-312).
6.

USU disagrees with much of #6 of First Equity's

statement of facts, appearing on pp. 10-12 of appellant's
brief.

In addition to the points of disagreement which already

have been noted above (e.g., First Equity's contention that
USU refused to accept delivery of all five orders of stock),
First Equity imprecisely states that one of the grounds on
which its motion for summary judgment was denied was that the
court found a triable issue of fact as to whether USU had
available any

ff

non-public funds" to invest in common stock. .

The court's order does not speak of "non-public funds."
Rather, it noted a triable issue as to whether "USU, at the
time Catron ordered the stock in question, or the time payment
for said stock fell due, had funds which it had received from
individual grants or development contracts sufficient to pay
for part or all of said stock."

Further, it said:

"There is

at least a triable issue uf fact" as to the foregoing (emphasis
added) (R. 435 B ) .
Finally, First Equity!s brief (p. 11, cf. p. 48) requires
clarifications on damages.

First Equity conceded after filing

its complaint that Regulation T of the Federal Reserve Board
limits its recoverable damages from USU on the Advanced Memory
stock to $15,625.00, and that the figure of $37,045.27 is
too high (R. 425). USU contends that nothing is recoverable.
7.

On page 3 of the amici brokers1 brief, it is

stated that First Equity acted as agent for USU (as opposed
to acting as a principal) in each of the five purchase
transactions in question.

Amici also state that Catron directed

First Equity to purchase those five orders for USU.

The

implication is that Catron knew that First Equity would act
as an agent.

Amici, however/ omit mention of the fact that

in two earlier transactions, First Equity acted as principal
in selling stock to USU (R. 116). There is no evidence that
when Catron placed orders for the five stocks in question,
he knew or desired that First Equity would act as an agent
in the transactions.
B.

Respondents Statement of Facts.

As the trial court recognized in granting USU f s cross
motion for summary judgment, the controlling facts of this
lawsuit are few.

Out of an abundance of caution, USU has set

-8-

forth many non-controlling facts above to counter the inaccuracies and omissions of First Equity's lengthy statement.
USU believes, however, the below statement of facts is
sufficient to enable this court to decide this appeal:
1.

On behalf of USU Catron placed a number of stock

purchase orders with First Equity beginning October 27, 1972
(R. 99-149, 160-161).
2.

In placing each order, Catron instructed First

Equity that payment would be made against delivery of the
certificates at First Security Bank, Logan, in the case of
some orders, and Walker Bank, Logan, in the case of other
orders (R. 312-313).
3.

Except for those five orders noted below, payment

was made for each order placed with First Equity by a subordinate of Catron delivering a check drawn on USU funds to
one or the other of said banks (R. 311-313).
4.

On or about December 15, 1972, Larry Anderson and

Fred Thompson, the managers respectively of the Logan branches
of First Security Bank and Walker Bank, read in one or more
of three newspapers serving Logan a report that the Attorney
General was of the opinion that USU had no power to purchase
stock1 (R. 326-328, 337-340, 353-356).

The opinion itself concluded that USU could use certain
funds (e.g. endowment funds) to purchase stock. None of the news
paper reports mentioned this "exception." The bank managers read
the newspaper reports but not the opinion.

5.

On January 17, 1973, Catron placed an order with

First Equity for 5,000 shares, AMS, payment against delivery
at First Security Bank, Logan.

On March 13, 1973, the Ex-

change National Bank of Tampa sent certificates for 3,000
shares to First Security Bank, Logan, in partial fulfillment
of said order.

The transmittal document which accompanied

the 3,000 shares, and which was directed to First Security
Bank, Logan, to the attention of Larry Anderson, contained
these instructions:
"For delivery to a/c Utah State
University against payment of draft attached
($67,019.00). Please credit our account
with FEDERAL RESERVE BANK IN JACKSONVILLE
FLORIDA THRU WIRE ADVICE ATTENTION of the
undersigned."
(R. 305, 307)
USU refused to pay for these or any other AMS shares.
6.

On January 31, 1973, Catron placed an order with

First Equity for 24,100 shares of Panelrama Corporation, payment against delivery at Walker Bank, Logan.

Said stock was

not tendered for delivery within 3 5 days thereof.
7.

On February 28, 1973, Catron placed the following

orders with First Equity, payment against delivery at Walker
Bank:
55,700
83,800
13,000

Cordura (Computing & Software)
Great Basins Petroleum
Natomas

-10-

8.

First Equity voluntarily cancelled all of the

above five purchase orders, except the order for AMS.
330-331, 342-343).

(R.

This fact appears to be disputed by First

Equity (R. 249-251).
9.

The diminution in value of the AMS stock between

the trade date (January 17, 1973) and February 22, 1973
(the 36th day after the trade date) was $15,625.00. (R. 424425).

.
10.

The total commissions on the four orders which •

were voluntarily cancelled by First Equity would have been
$13,134.15 if the orders were legal,

had not been cancelled

and, in the case of Panelrama, there had not been a violation
of Regulation T.

The commission for AMS would have been

$807.00 if the order had been valid, and there had been no
violation of Regulation T.
11.

(R. 425).

It is, a/t best, a disputed question of fact whether

Catron or one of his subordinates ever sent to First Equity a
copy of a corporate resolution dated January 20, 1971, purporting
to authorize Catron to purchase stock for USU, which resolution
was worded to "remain in full force and effect until written
notice of the revocation hereof shall be delivered to the
brokers."

Catron can not specifically remember sending it

(D. 75-77, 83). His secretary, v/ho handled his correspondence,
cannot remember specifically sending it, although it is possible
she did so (R. 3 21).

Moreover, she would only send to a broker
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a copy of the resolution if the broker requested written
authority, and USU f s correspondence files show no copies
of any correspondence whatsoever between USU and First
Equity (R. 303,321).

Finally, First Equity cannot find a

copy of the resolution in its files (R. 266, 300).
12.

In December, 1972r USU revoked Catron's authority

to purchase any stock by action which was reflected in minutes
of the Investment Committee of its Institutional Council and
of the Institutional Council itself (R. 310, 317). Appellant
appears to deny this.

•
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY GRANTED USU! S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.

The Court Below Correctly Held That USU Had No Power To
Purchase Stock And That The Five Purchase Orders In
Question Were Ultra Vires.
In Judge Christofferson's Memorandum Decision, he

stated:
"First, Utah State is alleged to have
contracted with the plaintiff for the purchase of certain stocks and have not paid
for the same. This court holds that any contracts by a public corporation which receives
its authority for existence by the state can
only enter into such contracts as are authorized by law and cannot obligate itself to
spend public monies without such authorization. The creation of Utah State by the

Territorial Legislature provided no such
authority or power to invest, nor does
the Utah State Constitution.
As to the statutory authority, Section
33-1-1 and 33-1-3, Utah Code Annotated,
provides what investments may be made by
a public corporation or political or public
body, and the court holds Utah State
University comes within this definition and
that the stocks in question do not fall within the enumerated securities as set forth
in that section, . . . "
In its order granting USU's cross motion for summary judgment,
the court held:
11

. . • that plaintiff's complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted against USU in that it is barred
by the provisions of the Utah Code prohibiting the investment by state employees
of funds in their custody in securities
other than those enumerated in Utah Code
§ 33-1-1."
1.

The Utah Constitution [and the 1888 Act]
First Equity and the amici brokers urge that this order

is contrary to the Utah Constitution.

Amici assert USU has

a "general grant of authority" with respect to state
appropriated funds, which includes within it the power to
purchase stock (p. 18, Amici brief).

This "general" grant,

it is contended, was originally conferred by section 4 of the
1888 Act establishing USU; section 4 states that the trustees
of the school shall have:
" . . . general control and supervision
. . . of all appropriations made by the
Territory. . ."
First Equity states that the "general authority" to control appropriations was perpetuated by Article X, Section 4 of the
Constitution (p. 13, appellant's brief, cf. pp. 25-26) Amici
have argued this point in related litigation.

This "general authority" (appellant's brief, p. 13), the
argument continues, became a premanent part of USUfs powers
at statehood by reason of Article X, § 4 of the Utah
Constitution, which provides, inter alia, that:
" . . . all the rights, immunities,
franchises and endowments heretofore
granted or conferred [upon USU] are
hereby perpetuated unto [USU]. . ."
In order for this argument to prevail, it must be true both
(1) that the 1888 Act conferred power on USU to buy stock;
and (2) that this power was one of the rights, etc., "perpetuated" by the State Constitution.
postulates are erroneous.

However, both of these

That the 18 88 Act did not confer

power on USU to purchase stock can be seen from a careful
study of the Act itself.
As to the contention that the Utah Constitution
"perpetuated" this unlimited power to invest, a virtually
identical argument was urged and soundly rejected in University
of Utah v. Board of Examiners of State of Utah, 4 Utah 2d
408, 295

P.2d 348.

In that case, the University of Utah con-

tended it was completely free from the control of the Legislature, administrative bodies, commissions, agencies and

As will be seen, whatever investment powers were conferred on USU by the Act were not perpetuated by the Constitution
at Statehood. Therefore the question of what powers the 188 8
Act conferred has become one of historical interest only and is
not therefore treated in the body of this brief. The limited scope
of the 1888 Act is discussed, however, in Appendix A.

1

A

officers of the State.

After thoroughly canvassing the

applicable Constitutional and statutory provisions and
legislative history in a 33-page opinion, the Utah Supreme
Court, through Justice Worthen, concluded, at p. 437:
"Nothing in the arguments and debates in
the Constitutional Convention on the education article, (x) and more particularly, on
Section 4, tends to suggest that it was considered by the delegates that the Legislature
by said article would be prohibited from acting
in respect to the University, except in
matters of location and establishment.
The entire thought of the convention in respect to the University and Agricultural
College was on the question of uniting them
or leaving them separate, and on the question
of location (emphasis added)."
And again, at p. 43 8, the court stated:
"Nowhere in the proceedings can an expression of intent be found that the Legislature should forever be prohibited from
acting in%any matters dealing with the
purpose and government of the University
except its establishment and location
(emphasis added)."
The court then focused on the most glaring weakness in the
University of Utah's position.

After quoting Section 1 and 2

of Article X of the Constitution, which mandate the legislature
to provide for the maintenance of the University of Utah
[and USU ) , the Court states, at pp. 439-440:
"Would it be contended by the University
that under Article X , Section 1, it might
compel the Legislature to appropriate money
the University considers essential? Is it
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contended that the demands of the University are not subject to constitutional debt
limits? If, so, respondent would have the
power to destroy the solvency of the State
and all other institutions by demands beyond the
power of the State to meet (emphasis added).11 •• / '

One might add that this power to destroy the solvency of the
State would be greater if USU had unlimited power to invest
or speculate with the appropriations it receives.
The court then quotes in full Sections 5 and 7 of
Article X of the Constitution, which provide, respectively,
that the proceeds of the sale of lands reserved by Congress
for the University of Utah shall constitute permanent funds
of the State, and that all public school funds shall be
guaranteed by the State against loss or diversion.

Then the

court concludes, at p. 440:
•"It is inconceivable that the framers
of the Constitution in light of the
provisions of Sections 1, 5, and 7 of
Article X, and the provision as to debt
limitations, intended to place the University
above the only controls available for the
people of this State as to the property,
management and government of the University.
We are unable to reconcile respondent's
position that the University has a blank check
as to all its funds with no pre-audit and no
restraint under the provisions of the Constitution requiring the State to safely invest
and hold the dedicated funds and making the
State guarantor of the public school funds
against loss or diversion. To hold that
respondent has free and uncontrolled custody
and use of its property and funds while making the

State guarantee said funds against loss or
diversion, is i nconceivable. We believe
that the framers of the Constitution intended
no such result (emphasis added)."
The appeal at bar is plainly controlled by the aforediscussed decision.

Article X, Section 4, mentions USU in the

same phrase as the University of Utah.

That the framers of the

Constitution, by Article X, Section 4, intended to "perpetuate"
to USU the right to invest or speculate at will with State
appropriations (assuming, arguendo, that the 18 88 Act conferred tha
right initially) and at the same time intended to guarantee all
public school funds against loss is "inconceivable," to quote from
Justice Worthen, supra.

It is even more so when one considers

Further, to interpret Section 4 of Article X so as to
perpetuate the right of USU to "control and supervise state appropriations" (being deemed to include the right to invest or speculate with those appropriations in anything) would be inconsistent
with Section 5 of Article X, ks noted in the University of Utah
case, supra. That Section provides:
"The proceeds of the sale of lands reserved
by an act of Congress, approved February 21,
1855, for the establishment of the University
of Utah, and of all the lands granted by an
act of Congress, approved July 16, 1894, [which
went to USU] shall constitute permanent funds,
to be safely invested and held by the State; and
the income thereof shall be used exclusively for
the support and maintenance of the different
institutions and colleges, respectively, in
accordance with the requiremenrs ana conditions
of said acts of Congress, (emphasis added)"
By Section 5, the State alone has power to hold and invest the corpus consisting of proceeds of the sale of certain lands, and even
then the State does not have unlimited p-.^wer to invest but must
do so safely. In contrast, the income from the corpus is to be
used "exclusively for the support and maintenance" of USU in
accordance with the requirements of the act of Congress granting
those lands. Thus, the Constitution, in Section 5, expressly prohibits USU from investing income from the corpus of a permanent
fund in even safe securities, or indeed from using that income for
any purpose except for its support and maintenance; however, appellant would urge that the Constitution, at the same time (in
Section 4 ) , empowers USU to invest or speculate with state appropriations in anything. This court should not infer such inconsis-

down on this right, it having become frozen into the Constitution.
2.

General Principles of Public Law and Utah's Statutory
Scheme Governing Public investments.
Appellant and amici- also assert that one or more

statutes passed since 1896 confer on USU unlimited power to
invest some or all of its funds.

Before examining these stat-

utes, the following general principles should be reviewed:
a.

USU Is A Public Corporation Which Possesses Only Such
Powers to Contract As Have Been Conferred Upon It By
Statute.

(1)

Treatises.
Since 1929, USU has been a "body politic and corporate."

Section 53-32-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953).

As such, it is subject

to the rule that governmental entities possess only those powers
to contract which have been conferred upon them.

McQuillin states

•the rule governing "school authorities" like USU as follows:
"... the prevailing rule is that such body
can enter into such contracts only as it is
empowered, expressly or impliedly, to make
and enforce /citing 21 cases from 15 jurisdictions/. That is to say, school boards or school
districts cannot contract ad libitum, ^as individuals
may do, but only respecting objects in the mode
and to the extent the law permits //citing more
cases/ " 16 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations
(1972 Rev. Volume) Section 46.07c, pp. 679-680.2
Note that the rule is said to be applicable to "school authorities,"
not just school districts or boards.
l"At pleasure; as one wishes; as far as one desires." Webster1s
New Collegiate Dictionary.
2McQuillin, in footnote 1 to Section 46.07c, quoted above, refers
the reader to Chapter 29 of his treatise. Chapter 29 deals with
the powers to contract possessed by municipal corporations strictly
speaking. Thus, McQuillin recognizes that the rule governing
"school authorities" quoted above is the same as the rule—sometimes
called Dillonfs Rule—governing municipal corporations.
-1 a-

See, also, Yokley on Municipal Corporations, where it
is said, at Section 385, p. 302:
"A school district has been referred to as
a corporation having the most limited powers
known to the law."
(2) Cases.
In Regents of the University of Nebraska v. McConnell,
5 Neb. 423, 428 (1877), it was said that the governing board of
that university (like USU, a land grant college) "acts simply by
delegated authority, and can exercise only such powers as are
expressly given to it, or which may be necessary to carry into
effect those powers specially given."
Public quasi-corporations, like USU,-1- have long been
held by the courts to possess only those powers derived from
statute.

In Grabe v. Lamro Independent Consolidated School

District, 221 N.W. 697,698 (S.D., 1928), it was said:
"... it is well established that the powers
of /public quasiy corporations are limited to
those granted by statute."
The approach of common law in interpreting legislative
grants of power to public bodies concerning the handling of public
monies is illustrated by National Surety v. State, 239 P.257,
260 (Okl., 1925), a case involving the question of whether a county
ln

A public corporation which is not municipal is one created by
the state solely as its own device and agency ... a state university
... and a state board of education constitute, if incorporated,
illustrations of this class. Because the independent powers of such
corporations are frequently nominal, or small, ... and their officers
and members (if any) have no individual interest in them, these
organizations are sometimes described ... as public quasi corporations. " 1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (1971 Rev. Vol.)
Section 2.03(b) p. 133.
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treasurer, under a statute empowering him to sell bonds initially purchased with county sinking funds, had power to
reinvest the proceeds of sale in similar bonds.

In holding

that he did not, the court stated, at p. 260:
"It seems certain that, in the absence of
statutory authority to invest the sinking
funds in his hands, it was the duty of the
county treasurer to preserve the sinking funds
which came into his official hands intact in money.
Before the custodian of the sinking fund could
invest such fund in any manner, he must be able to
put his finger upon some express statutory provision which would authorize the investment... ."
(3)

Cases involving municipal corporations.
USU also relies by analogy on the myriad of cases

involving municipalities and school districts.

This elementary

principle has been held by the United States Supreme Court to
apply to municipal corporations.
"Such corporations ... may exert only such
powers as are expressly granted to them, or
such as may be necessarily implied from those
granted... . They may be created, ... their
powers may be restricted ... or altogether withdrawn at the will of the legislature." Atkin v.
Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 220, 48 L.Ed. 148, 157
(1903).
A tendency to narrowly interpret grants of legislative power
to municipalities is also seen in Town of Worland v. Odell &
Johnson, 329 P.2d 797, 803 (Wyo., 1958):
"... all the courts, without a single
exception so far as we know, agree that a
municipality has only such powers as are
granted to it by the legislature. That
itself seems to mean that a power not granted
is a power prohibited. As stated in Van Eaton
v. Town of Sidney, 211 Iowa 986, 231 N.W. 475,
477, 71 A.L.R., 820, citing numerous cases: .
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'Where a statute confers certain specific
powers/ those not enumerated are withheld.
In other words, enumeration of powers operates
to exclude such as are not enumerated.f
(emphasis
added)"
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has held that municipal powers
cannot lightly be inferred by implication.

In Moss ex rel

State Tax Commission v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
City, 1 Ut. 2d 60, 261 P.2d 961, 964 (1953), it said:
"This court has not favored the extension
of the powers of the city by implication, and
the only modification of such doctrine is where
the power is one which is necessarily implied.
Unless this requirement is met, the power cannot be deduced from any consideration of convenience
or necessity, or desirability of such result, and
no doubtful inference from other powers granted
or from ambiguous or uncertain provisions of the
law would be sufficient to sustain such authority."
b.

Principles of statutory construction regarding

power to invest.
In considering whether any power to purchase stock
has been conferred upon'USU, the following excerpt from a leading authority should be borne in mind:
"The right to make contracts for the purchase
of such essentials as office supplies, coal,
and similar needs covering its ordinary requirements is clearly necessary to enable the municipality to carry out the purposes for which it
was created and the power to so contract is implied from such purposes. However, the right
of a municipality to enter into contracts for
products or services other than the usual
necessities, such as the purchase of automobile
testing equipment when no authority to test
automobiles exists, contracts for housing of
veterans and their families, and similar contracts covering activities not customarily engaged
in by cities, raises legal questions of a novel
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character and the courts adopt a strict,
rather than a liberal construction of the
powers of a municipality and any ambiguity
or doubts as to the: existence of the extent of
the grant of power will be resolved against its
existence or expansion... . In considering contracts of public corporations, the courts apply
the ultra vires rule with a greater degree of
strictness than in the case of private corporations inasmuch as the rights and interests of
the citizens of the municipality are directly involved and the question of public policy arises."
(emphasis added). Rhyne, Charles S., Municipal
Law, Section 10-2, 3, pp. 256-258.
See, also, Hoskins v. City of Orlando, 51 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir.).
In examining Utah statutes to ascertain whether they
empower USU to purchase stock, we must also start with the
common law presumption that a public corporation may not acquire
property or spend money for investment or speculation.

Hoskins

v. City of Orlando, supra; Powell v. Birmingham, 61 So.2d 11, 18
(Ala., 1952); National Surety v. State, supra; Gilbert v. City of
Dayton, 59 N.E. 2d 954, 955 (Ohio Ct. App., 1944); Baker v. City
of Palo Alto, 12 Cal. Rptr. 425, 430 (D.C.A., 1961); 63 C.J.S.
Section 959, pp. 508-509; Rhyne, supra, Section 16-6, p. 374; 10
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3d Ed. (1966 revised volume)
Section 28.11, p. 26.
c.

Utah statutory scheme governing investments by
state agencies.

As recognized by the court below, any analysis of
Utah statutes on the subject of investments by state agencies
must begin with Sections 33-1-1 and 33-1-3, Utah Code Annotated
(1953), both of which were enacted as part of the same act in 1939.
Section 33-1-1 provides simply that investment by certain

enumerated entities in certain enumerated securities "shall
be lawful,11

The entities" enumerated are virtually all

either public entities or entities which are strictly regulated by government, such as receivers, insurance companies,

^Section 33-1-1 also contains the following: "•.. the
investment by any private, political or public instrumentality,
body, corporation or person of their own funds or funds in
their possession in /the enumerated securities/
be
1
lawful (emphasis added.)'
That the Legislature should feel it
necessary to declare investment by private persons in these securities to be lawful seems unnecessary at first glance. Section
33-1-3, however, suggests a reason why this was done. The first
sentence of Section 33-1-3, which was enacted as part of the
same act as Section 33-1-1, provides that wherever state law
requires either a deposit of securities or the posting of a bond
with security, the securities enumerated in Section 33-1-1 shall
be acceptable as security "without other security." The posting of bonds with security or the deposit of securities pursuant
to state law is something which is almost exclusively done by private persons; hence, the purchase of the securities enumerated in
Section 33-1-1 by a private person is lawful in that it meets any
requirements as to the posting of a bond with security or the
deposit of securities.
The title of S. B. 158 (Laws of Utah, 1939) enacting
Section 33-1-1 supports the above interpretation in that (1) it
does not mention private entities as those authorized by the
Act to invest in the enumerated securities and (2) it describes
that part of the Act relating to securities which are acceptable
for bonds and deposits of securities in language that encompasses
posting of bonds and deposit of securities by all entities, including
private persons and corporations. The title of an act may possibly
be used under certain circumstances in construing a statute, if
the latter is ambiguous. American Smelting & Refining Co. v.
State Tax Commission, 16 Utah 2d 147, 397 P.2d 67, 70 (1964).
The title to S. B. 158 is a particularly useful tool in
interpreting the bill because the title itself was twice amended
during the passage of the bill. Senate Journal, 1939, pp. 237, 529.
The full title to S. B. 158 is set forth as Appendix B.
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The securities enumerated aro all government guaranteed
securities such as "bonds and other obligations of ... the
United States."

There is no question but what USU is a

"public corporation" or "political, or public ... body (or)
corporation" within the meaning of Section 33-1-1.

There is also

no question but what the securities in question in this lawsuit
(stocks) do not fall within the enumeration of securities set
forth in that section.
Section 33-1-3, states in relevant part:
"The provisions of this act are supplemental to any and all other laws relating to
and declaring what shall be legal investments
for the persons, corporations, organizations
and officials referred to in this act... .
(emphasis added)."

.

It is apparent that in enacting Section 31-1-3 the Legislature
envisioned situations where certain governmental entities of
the kind mentioned in Section 3 3-1-1 might be empowered to invest in securities of a'type not enumerated in Section 33-1-1.
Further, the language of Section 33-1-3, quoted above, was worded
to include within its meaning any laws which the Legislature
might enact thereafter.

Subsequent to the enactment of Section

33-1-3, the Legislature has enacted the following code sections
containing, in most cases, detailed statutory definitions of
what are legal investments for the state agency or regulated
"industry" specified therein:

Indeed, in 1939, when Sections 33-1-1 and 33-1-3 were enacted,
the State Land Board already possessed statutory power to invest
its funds in securities not enumerated in Section 33-1-1, e.g.,
"state, county, city or school district bonds."
-24-

Agency or "Industry"

Utah Code Sections (1953)

Utah State Retirement
Board

49-9-12

Fiduciaries (E.G.,
executors)

7-5-11

Insurance Companies

31-13-1, et seq.

Department of Finance

63-2-34

State Land Board

65-1-65 (present,
statute)
However, no statute enacted prior or subsequent to 1939 defines
what types of securities USU may legally invest in.
From the above, it is clear that while the Legislature
on numerous occasions has granted other state agencies power to
invest in securities not set forth in Section 33-1-1, it has granted
no such power to USU.

Applying the principles of statutory con-

struction set forth above, it must be concluded that USU had no
power from the Legislature to invest in stock.
3.

Statutes Enacted Sihce Statehood.
The statutes relied upon by appellant follow, together

with USU's arguments showing that reliance to be misplaced:
a.

The 1929 Act
Amici cite language from Section 15, Chapter 41, Laws of

Utah (1929).1

However, as amici concede, that section was re-

pealed in 1969, making it completely irrelevant to this appeal.

"The Board shall have the general control and supervision ... of
all appropriations .... and also of lands or personal property that
may be hereafter donated ... ."

-?R~

Appellant cites other language from the 1929 Act —
now Section 53-32-4, Utah Code Annotated (1953)2 ~ which
was in effect during the period in question.

It contends that

this section empowers USU to invest all property received by
private donation in any form of investment whatever including stock.
To construe this section as authorizing USU to invest that
category of funds in any and all kinds of securities is to
disregard the language of Section 33-1-3, discussed on pp.
22-25, supra.

That section envisions that other laws would

supplement and refine those laws empowering agencies to invest.
Section 53-32-4 is not the kind of law envisioned by Section
33-1-3 in that it does not declare "what shall be legal investments."
In other words, Section 53-32-4 by itself does not empower USU
to invest these monies; it only makes them available for investment in "legal investments" as otherwise "declared" by legislation.

To read Section 53-32-4 as defendants contend would logic-

ally require the court to hold that the category of funds described therein could be legally invested in anything; such a construction flies in the teeth of the common law presumption that a

^"The Utah State Agricultural College (Utah State University
of Agriculture and Applied Science) ... may take by purchase,
grant, gift, devise or bequest any property real or personal
for the use of any department of the college and for any purpose
appropriate to the objects of the college. It may convert
property received by gift, grant, devise or bequest and not
suitable for its uses into other property or into money. Such
property so received or converted shall be held, invested and
managed and the proceeds thereof used by the board of trustees
for the purposes and under the conditions prescribed in the
grant or donation."
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municipal corporation may not: spend money for speculation,
and the public law canon of construction that powers to
contract for items other than necessaries shall be strictly
construed.

See pp. 21-22 of this Brief.

The fact that the monies referred to in Section 53-32-4
have not been appropriated by the Legislature, but rather come
from other sources, does not render inapplicable the common
law rule that a public body has only those powers specifically
conferred upon it by statute.
In State ex rel Davis v. Clausen, 160 Wash. 618, 295
Pac. 751, 757 (1931), the court held that federal monies intended
for Washington State College but received by the state treasurer
were subject to a Washington statute prohibiting the state
treasurer from transferring monies to the college without a
legislative appropriation, notwithstanding statutory language
providing that monies received from the United States for the
benefit of the college, when deposited with the treasurer,
"... shall be held as special funds for
said college, and are hereby appropriated to
the uses and purposes for which the same are
received. "
The court held that money coming into the custody of the state
treasurer, although specifically earmarked for the use of
the State College and by statute "appropriated to the uses and
purposes" of the college, partook of the same character as
monies received by the state treasurer from state appropriations
in the sense that only a legislative appropriation could
authorize the treasurer to disburse them out to the college.
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In Mahon v. Board of Education of City of New York,
63. N.E. 1107 (N.Y., 1902), the court held that a constitutional
provision forbidding any city to give money in aid of any
individual applies to money the city received from sources other
than public taxation.
In Storen v. Sexton, 209 Ind. 589, 200 N.E. 251 (1936),
the Indiana Supreme Court squarely held that monies donated to
Purdue University (a land grant college, like USU) were to
be treated the same as state funds once they were received;
therefore, they could only be spent as the Legislature directed.
The court reasoned, at p. 261, as follows:
"When the trustors created the trusts and
placed them in the hands of public officers they
must be deemed to have understood that the discretion of those officers concerning the details
of safeguarding and preserving the corpus of the
trust, and insuring the safety and availability
of current funds, could be and might be controlled
by the Legislature."
See also State ex r e L University of Utah v. Candland,
36 U't. 406, 425-426, 104 Pac. 285 (1909); University of North
Carolina v. Maultsby, 43 N.C. 257, 264 (1852); and Trustees of
the University of Alabama v. Winston, 5 Stewart & P. 17 (Ala..
1833) to the effect that property owned by state controlled universities (like USU) is actually property of the state.
b.

The Higher Education Act of 1969.
(1)

State appropriations.

Another statute relied

on as granting USU power to invest state appropriations in
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stock is Section 53-48-10 (c<) ,1 enacted as part of the Higher
Education Act of 1969.

Amici concede (p. 17, amici brief),

that the language they rely on is not specific; indeed, they
suggest that the Legislature consciously avoided being specific. 2

Thusf it is conceded that reliance on this statute con-

tradicts the canon of statutory construction that legislation
purporting to grant public bodies power to contract other than
for necessaries is to be strictly constructed.

The untena-

bility of appellant's reliance on this statute is underscored by
the realization that if the phrase "handle its own financial affairs" imports within it the power to invest in stock, it also
includes the power to invest in any form of investment or
speculation; and further by the fact that these unlimited powers
to invest or speculate with state monies would be held not only
by each of the seven state colleges and universities in the state
but also by each of the two technical colleges.

To ascribe an

intent to the Legislature to clothe every small college and
technical school in the state with a power that could so easily
result in the total loss of tens of millions of dollars stretches
credulity to its breaking point.

llf

Each university and college and the Utah Technical College
at Provo and the Utah Technical College at Salt Lake may do
its own purchasing, issue its own payrolls, and handle its own
financial affairs, under the general supervision of the board
as provided in this act (emphasis theirs)."
2

Their exact language is:
"... the Utah Legislature avoided a specification of how
the University should handle its finances when it reiterated the
University's general authority to manage its finances in a 1969
Act (Utah Code Ann., Section 53-48-10 (5) (1953))."
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By way of background, the Higher Education Act of 1969,
of which Section 53-48-10 (5) is a part, created the predecessor body to the Utah Board of Regents.

The Act is

concerned with dividing duties between the Board of Regents,
on the one hand, and the universities and colleges, on the
other.

Handling one's "own financial affairs under the general

supervision of the Board" was said to be the duty of the
universities and colleges.

By "financial affairs," the

Legislature appears to have intended to mean matters such
as purchasing and issuing payrolls, the two specific functions,
mentioned in the same list of powers as the phrase "handle
its own financial affairs."

In other words, the rule of ejusdem

generis governs in construing what is meant by handling one's
"own financial affairs."

This rule of construction is defined

in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., as follows:
"In the construction of laws ... where
general words follow an enumeration of persons
or things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed
in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general
kind or class as those specifically mentioned."
(2)

Research and Development Funds.

Appellant

relies on Section 53-48-20 (3) 1 (also part of the 1969 Act) for
the proposition that USU has power to invest in stock any monies

^Appellant sets forth part of the statutory language on
p. 15 of its brief.

Section 53-48-20(2), not quoted by appellant,

makes it clear that the statute is referring at this point only,
to research and development funds.
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derived from nonstate sources for research or development.
Again, the logic of its proposition compels the result that
USU has power to invest or speculate with these monies in
anything.

Subsection (3)(d) of that section does authorize

USU as well as every other "institution, college, or department or its foundation or organization" to invest the research
monies referred to in the section.

However, Section 53-48-20

(3)(d) is not a law "relating to and declaring what shall be
legal investments" for USU as envisioned by Section 33-1-3;
Section 53-48-20 (3) (d) merely makes available for investment
in "legal investments" (as otherwise declared

by legislation)

a narrow category of funds - funds of a nature which, absent
this authorization, might be thought to be unavailable for any
type of investment.
4.

Proper Interpretation of 33-1-1
Appellant and amici contend that the trial court in-

correctly construed Section 33-1-1 as an enabling statute.1
Amici argue that the section "is simply declarative of the presumptive legality of certain investments without being exclusive (p. 19, amici brief)."

Appellant apparently urges the

same interpretation.2

1

This lengthy section is quoted in full in an appendix to the

brief of amici and on pp. 18-19 of appellant!s brief.
2"... Section 33-1-1 was enacted as a legal list to declare
presumptively legal investments for persons entrusted with
investment responsibilities."
(p. 25, app. brief).
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That § 33-1-1 is an enabling statute
considers the language of § 33-1-3

is clear when one
that "Whenever. . . a

deposit of securities is required, . . the securities made legal
investments by this act shall be acceptable" and stating further
that the "provisions of this act are supplemental to any and all
other laws relating to and declaring what shall be legal investments for the. . . corporations. . . referred to in this act. . .
(emphasis added)."
make

or

The only part of the act which could be said to

declare "what shall be legal investments for the . . .

corporations. . . referred to in the act. . ." is § 33-1-1.
also § 33-1-4 and 33-1-4.1.

See

That § 33-1-1 was believed to be an

enabling statute by the legislature is seen from the title of the
bill enacting it (S.B. 158, 1939) which reads:
Insurance Companies, . . .
United States, . . . "

"An Act Authorizing

to Invest in Bonds Issued by the

See Appendix B for complete title.

The title to S.B. 158 is especially helpful in showing the
Legislature intended § 33-1-1 to be an enabling provision because
of the care the title received, having been amended twice during
the course of the bill's passage.

Senate Journal, 1939, pp. 237,

529.
Appellant argues in favor of its interpretation of
§33-1-1 by reference to the law governing trusts and private
fiduciaries (p. 22, app. brief).

However, § 33-1-1 has nothing to

do with the law of trusts or the "prudent man rule" of § 33-2-1
which was not enacted until 1951. *
"
^Two major works have compiled all code sections of Utah
law (and the law of other states) bearing on what are "legals" for
private fiduciaries. Bogurt, Trusts and Trustees, 2d ed. § 657;3
CCH Blue Sky Law Reporter, 43,7 01. Neither of these mentions
§ 33-1-1 in its compilation.

Finally, amici suggest that this case be remanded
to take factual evidence as to how Utah colleges have interpreted § 33-1-1 to assist the court in construing it (p. 18,
amici brief).

However, appellant did not offer any evidence

on this below and does not urge on appeal that the case be
remanded.

If there was error in not conducting a factual

inquiry, it was invited error.

Moreover, such a factual in-

quiry is helpful in statutory construction only where the
statute is ambiguous.
30 Utah 2d
5.

Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, •

102, 514 P.2d 217 (1973).

Money Management Act of 1974.
Appellant and amici argue that the passage of the

197 4 Money Management Act proves the court below erred in construing § 33-1-1 to be an enabling provision.
First, they urge that the fact the 197 4 Act amends
specific sections of the Utah Code, but does not amend
§ 33-1-1, somehow comports with their contention that said
section is "declarative of the presumptive legality of certain
investments without being exclusive."

This is a non sequitur.

They also suggest that the fact the Act does not amend § 3 3-1-1
shows that the section is not an enabling provision; this
also does not follow.
Secondly, amici attempt to make some point from the
fact that Section 4 of the Act does not transfer to the state
1
Appellant nakedly asserts in its brief (p. 16) that "USU
and other Utah Universities have had a long history of investing in
common stock. . ." Since appellant did not offer any evidence below to show this, and since clearly the production of such evidence
was within its control, this court may draw an inference that the
evidence would have been nnfavnr^hlp +-r> Pircf T?mn +-xr -D™.^ TT

treasurer investment powers over certain funds, including
certain funds of member institutions of the state system of
higher education.

What point they wish to make from this

fact is not clear.
Thirdly, amici urge that the fact these college
funds can be invested in securities not enumerated in § 33-1-1
suggests the Legislature did not regard § 33-1-1 as an enabling
provision.

But this

contention stubbornly ignores the plain

language of § 33-1-3 which makes clear that § 33-1-1 is not .
exclusive.
Finally, amici deduce from one of the stated purposes
of the 1974 Act that § 33-1-1 is not an enabling provision
since if it were, a "statewide policy for the deposit and investment of public funds" would already be present and there
would be no need for a "new" policy (the word "new" is not
in the Act).

This argument is defective in that (1) nowhere

does the Act suggest that there was no pre-existing law governing
the deposit and investment of public funds; indeed the Act
specifically amends many pre-existing sections of the Code
dealing with the deposit and investment of public funds (e.g.
§ 65-1-65) and (2) the phrase "establish. . . a policy" does
not logically preclude the prior existence of a different

"To establish and maintain a continuing statewide
policy for the deposit and investment of public funds."
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policy.

Further, this court can take judicial notice that

for years the Legislature has sought to bring the investment
functions of various state agencies under a centralized source
and to that end enacted the Money Management Act of 1969,
later declared unconstitutional.

But this does not mean

there was no prior policy.
The 1969 Act, far from disproving, merely confirms
that § 33-1-1 is an enabling provision.
B.

Judge Christofferson Did Not Find A Triable Issue Of
Fact In Granting USU's Cross Motion.
Appellant and amici argue that the court below found

a genuine issue of fact as to whether there were enough
monies legally "available" to USU for investment in stock
at the time the five orders were placed.

They misconstrue

the effect of the court's two separate orders.

In the order

denying First Equity's motion, the court stated three separate
grounds, basing its order on each of them.

One £md only one)

of the grounds was:
"There is at: least a triable issue of
fact whether USU [had grant or contract
money sufficient to pay for the stock]
(emphasis added)."
The words "at least" suggest the court had doubts as to whether
grant or contract monies were lawfully available to purchase stock.
For purposes of denying First Equity's motion, however, the court
did not have to decide this legal question.

Moreover, in light

of the other two grounds it gave for denying First Equity's motion,
the court's reference to a possible triable issue of fact was
unnecessary.

In his order granting USU f s Cross Motion, however,
Judge Christofferson gave only one ground; namely, that USU
could not invest any funds in its custody in stock.

In thus

granting USU's motion, the court below had to decide, whether
grant or contract monies were lawfully available to invest,
in stock.

Its decision was they were not.

What appellant really contends is that the language
of the order granting USU f s motion is inconsistent with
certain language of Judge Christoffersenfs memorandum decision.
By way of response, first, Judge Christoffersen did not say
in his memorandum that there was a triable issue of fact;
he only said "assuming that there was authority for the
university to invest those [grant or contract] funds, it
would be a triable issue of fact as to what funds there might
have been that fell within this category."

Sedond, it should

be remembered that in his single memorandum decision, Judge
Christoffersen explained both his grounds for denying First
Equity's motion for summary judgment and his ground for
granting USU f s cross motion for summary judgment.

The

order granting USU's motion made no reference to a possible
triable issue of fact.
Third, it is elementary that "Where it is reasonably
possible to do so, such construction should be adopted as will
give force and effect to the judgment, will make it servicable
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instead of useless, and will support rather than destroy it.11
46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 74, p. 364. Hubble v. Cache County
Drainage Dist., 123 Utah 405, 410 (1953).

•

Fourth, even assuming an inconsistency, the language
of the order displaces the language of the memorandum decision.
Indeed, "the opinion of a judge upon matters submitted, whether
oral or in writing, does not necessarily form a part of the
judgment proper.

It is only what a court adjudicates, and not

what it says in an opinion, that has any direct legal effect."
46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 6, pp. 316-317.

The order was pre-

pared by USU at the court1s direction with a copy of the proposed
order being served on First Equity so that it might object
if it felt the order did not properly reflect the court's views.
No objection was made by First Equity before the order was
signed.
C.

The Court Below Correctly Held That An Ultra Vires Contract
Cannot Be Enforced Against a Public Entity.
It is well settled in Utah, that where a public entity

has undertaken to enter a contract which was wholly outside the
power of the entity to make, such a contract is void and cannot
be enforced against the entity.
In News Advocate Pub. Co. v. Carbon County, 7 2 Utah 88f
269 P. 129, 130, the Carbon County Clerk caused to be published

in plaintiff newspaper a notice of sale of property on which
taxes were delinquent.

Defendant county/ on receiving the

publication bill, refused payment.

In defending a suit

brought for the amount of the bill, defendant urged (1) that
the Clerk had received no authority from the county commission
to authorize the publication, and (2) even if he had, the
contract was ultra vires because the county commissioners
had no statutory power to confer such an authorization.

The

first defense was said to be unavailable based on the facts
in the record.

Finding the second defense dispositive of

the case, the court held for the defendant, saying:
"The general principle or rule of law that
municipal corporations are not bound by contracts made without authority or in excess
of the powers of such corporations is conceded.
The rule applicable is stated in 15 C.J.
540, as follows:
!

A county is not bound by a contract beyond
the scope of its powers or foreign to its
purposes, or which is outside of the authority
of the officers making it. In this connection
it is the rule that the authority of a county
board to make contracts is strictly limited
to that conferred, either expressly or impliedly,
by statute, regardless of benefit to the county
or of value received; and the same is true as to
other county officers attempting to contract in
behalf of the county. * * * All persons dealing
with officers or agents of counties are bound
to ascertain the limits of their authority or
power as fixed by statutory or organic law,
and are chargeable with knowledge of such limits.
No estoppel can be created by the acts of such
agents or officers in excess of their statutory
or constitutional powers.1
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The same rule or principle is announced both in
McQuillan [sic] and Dillon on Municipal
Corporations. (emphasis added)."
The amici here have previously attempted to distinguish
the Carbon County case by a not very convincing exercise in
semantics.

They have urged that in that case, plaintiff

publisher could not recover on its printing bill from the
County because the printing contract had been entered into
contra to a specific statutory provision.

But a careful

reading of that case discloses no statute prohibiting the
county from contracting with a printer to advertise a noticeof sale where the county did not have power to sell the land.
That the court based its decision on the absence of power on
the part of the County to enter the printing contract under
the circumstances, as opposed to a supposed finding that the
County!s action in entering the contract was contra to a
specific statutory provision, is seen from the court's concluding paragraph, at p. 131t
"A contract of the county made with the
plaintiff for the publication of notice of
sale of the property, the title to which the
conservation district had acquired, was clearly
no part of its corporate duties or powers, and
under the recognized rules hereinbefore referred
to must be held to be beyond the powers of the
county commissioners and as such not binding
upon the county."

In related litigation in the United States District
Court for Utah.
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The rationale of the Carbon County case was reiterated
in Thatcher Chemical v. Salt Lake City, 21 U.2d 355, 445 P.2d
769, 771 (1968), where the court said:
"One who deals with a municipal corporation
does so at his own peril. He is presumed to
know the municipal ordinances controlling the
administration of public business and the
limitations on the powers and authority of
the City officers he is dealing with,"
The Utah rule enunciated in the two above cases
the majority rule.

clearly is

See Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill,

332 U.S. 380, 383-385, 68 S. Ct. 1, 2-3; Utah Power & Light
v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 37 S. Ct. 387, 391; Denver &
Salt Lake Ry. Co. v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement District, 35
F.2d 365, 372 (D. Colo.), mod. on appeal, 45 F.2d 715 (10th
Cir.); Finch v. Matthews

, 443 P.2d 83 3 (Wash.); New Mexico

v. City of Aztec, 424 P.2d 801, 802 (N. Mex.); Everds Bros.
v. Gillespie, 126 N.W.2d 274, 277 (la.);

County Board of

Education of Coffee County v. City of Elba, 135 So. 2d 812,
813 (Ala.); Los Angeles Dredging Co. v. City of Long Beach,
291 p. 839, 842 (Cal.); McQuillin, supra, § 29-02, p. 214,
§ 29-10, pp. 252-53; Yokley, 3 Municipal Corporation § 438;
Rhyne, Charles S., Municipal Law, p. 2 58.
To alleviate what some have considered to be an unduly
harsh result, a number of states have passed statutes authorizing
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entities which have entered into ultra vires contracts to
make payment thereunder under specified circumstances.
e.g. Wisconsin, § 66.295 Stats. (1941);

See

Utah, it should be

noted, has not passed such a statute.
Amici (p. 10, amici brief) advance the curious proposition that in Utah, contracts made in the absence of specific
statutory authorization (as opposed to the presence of explicit
prohibitory statutes) may be enforced by a party against a
public entity.

They refer to no language of the Utah Supreme

Court articulating or even suggesting this rule, but rely on
their analysis of Baker Lumber Co. v. A. A. Clark, 53 Ut. 336,
178 P. 764 (1919).

In that case, a school district entered

a contract with a builder for a new school building.

This con-

tract was admitted to be perfectly within the powers of the
school district.

(p. 34 9) . When it appeared that the building

was virtually completed, the school district, being short of
funds to pay the balance of $7,500 then due and owing on the
construction contract, issued two warrants for the amount due,
2
payable in one year,and bearing the legal rate of interest.
In litigation brought by a materialman (the builder having gone
The distinction urged between contracts ultra vires because they are expressly prohibited and those ultra vires because
the public cprporation had no power to enter them has been expressly rejected by the Supreme Courts of Wyoming and Iowa. See
pp. 20-21, supra.
2
The legal rate was 8%. The warrants, for some unexplained
reason, were drawn to bear interest at 6% but the difference of 2%,
or $150.0.0, was added to the amount unpaid. p. 349.
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bankrupt), the school district denied liability for the one
year's worth of interest on the ground that there was "no
express provision in the statutes of this state authorizing
school boards or other public corporations to issue interestbearing warrants (p. 349)."

The court held the school district

liable for the interest, but not on the ground suggested by
amici.

The court's ratio decidendi is seen from the following

language:
"It is not a question of the school board
agreeing to pay interest either by warrant
or otherwise. It is a question of its duty
on one side and the right of the creditor on
the other. It is a right that the statute
gives to any one who has money due and who
is unable to collect the same."
The statute referred to is, of course, the statute establishing
the legal rate of interest.
Thus, it is seen that the court in Baker held that the
school district was liable to pay interest at the legal rate
not because it contracted to do so, but rather because the
statute imposed an obligation to do so and this obligation
applied to public as well as to private corporations.

It is

clear from the language of the opinion that if the school district
had agreed to pay an amount in interest over the legal rate, the
excess amount would not have been allowed.

2

Comp. Laws of Utah, 1907, section 1241.
2
Baker can also be explained on the ground that the
school district had the implied power to contract to pay late
because it did not have the money to pay on time, this right being
necessarily implied from its conceded right to contract to build
the school in the first place. See the Moss case, decided by
this court, cited on p. 21, supra.

Amici

contend that the doctrine of estoppel operates

to allow First Equity to enforce the ultra vires purchase
orders.

However, as this Court noted in the Carbon County

case, supra, estoppel cannot be created by the ultra vires
acts of public agents or officers.
amici are inapposite.

The Utah cases cited by

In Provo City v. Denver & Rio Grande

Western, 156 F.2d 710 (10th Cir., 1946), the Court construed
two of the cases cited by the amici here very narrowly.

Re-

ferring to Wall vs. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593,' 168 P. 766 •
(1917) and Tooele City v. Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d
406 (1941) , the court said, at p. 712:
"These. . . cases, considered in their
composite effect, seem to make it clear
that in Utah the principle of estoppel
in pais is to be applied .very narrowly to
a city in respect of its right to reopen a
street for use as a public thoroughfare
and only in cases where the city acted within
the ambit of "its legal authority but in an
irreg'ular way. . ."
In the appeal at bar, USU did more than act "within the ambit
of its legal authority, but in an irregular way"; it acted
completely outside the ambit of its legal authority.
The other authorities cited by amici are likewise
inapplicable to an ultra vires contract.

The agreement con-

sidered in Beadles v. Smyser, 209 U.S. 393, 404 (1908), was
expressly said to be not "void for want of power."

And the

treatise cited by amici, 1A Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law,
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Section 10.10 (1973), states:
11

. . . the doctrine of estoppel is not
applied against local governments when the
contract is ultra vires in the sense of
being beyond its competence under all
circumstances."
D.

First Equity Cannot Recover On An Ultra Vires Contract .
Notwithstanding It May Have Acted As Agent For USU In
The Five Transactions And Not As Principal
First Equity and amici contend that even assuming the

purchase orders to be ultra vires, First Equity is not barred
from recovering the broker commissions on the five orders or
the loss it suffered in selling the AMS stock because it was
USU's agent.

This argument was not urged below and should

therefore be disregarded here.
Further, the argument is defective in its application
to both the broker commissions and the alleged loss on the AMS
stock.

As to the broker commissions, First Equity was not an

agent as to USU; it was the other party to five contracts with
USU whereby USU was to pay it commissions for its services.
Since those contracts were ultra vires, they are as unenforceable
as any other ultra vires contract for the performance of
services.
The argument is defective in its application to the loss
allegedly suffered on the AMS stock because it first assumes
that First Equity was acting only as the agent for USU.
1

Judicial

Davis v. Mulholland, 25 Utah 2d 56, 475 P.2d 834 (1970);
Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P.2d 185 (1954).

notice can be taken of the fact that a broker often acts as
the agent of the seller as well as for the buyer.

USU does

not concede that First Equity acted only as its agent and
there is no evidence showing this to be the case.

Further

the argument completely ignores the rationale of the law
denying recovery on an ultra vires
the reality of the situation.

contract as applied to

This court can take judicial

notice that in ordering stock through a broker, a purchaser
does not know who the seller is.

The broker is the only party

with which the purchaser has any dealings.

Conversely, the

seller who acts through a broker does not know the identity
of the buyer.

.Substantive rights should not be determined by

the niceties of the securities industry in designating the broker
as the agent of the buyer or as the agent of the buyer and seller;
the buyer's dealings with the broker are the same in every
case.

Surely it cannot be contended that USU is liable

on an ultra vires

order to purchase stock if the broker

was acting as an agent but is not liable if the broker was
acting as principal and was selling its own stock to USU.

The

rules of public law controlling this case are not so arbitrary;
rather they deny recovery on an ultra vires contract on the
theory that the party actually dealing with the public
entity is charged with the knowledge that the contract is ultra
vires.

This rationale does not allow a party who directly deals

with the entity and therefore should be charged with the knowledge that the contract is ultra vires to recover on the contract
The name of the other party to a transaction "brokered" by
^1^^+"
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on the technicality that he was just acting as an agent and
that any losses should be borne not by him but by the seller
of the stock notwithstanding the seller did not know his stock
was being
itT

sold to a public entity which had no power to buy

If such a rule were recognized —

and no authority in

the area of public law is cited to support it.-- the taxpayers
would lose the protection the ultra vires doctrine was designated
to give.
Cases supporting USU f s contention that First Equity, •
and not the unknown seller, should bear the loss are:
1.

Hirning v. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,

52 F. 2d 382, 82 A.L.R. 297 (8th Cir., 1931).

Plaintiff

receiver of insolvent bank sought to recover as voidable preferences the sum of remittances made by the bank to defendant
Federal Reserve Bank in response to the latter sending it
checks drawn on it.

Defendant argued that it was not a creditor

of plaintiff's bank in receiving remittances, but was merely
an agent of the other member banks in forwarding their checks
for collection.

The court agreed defendant was not a creditor

but held it liable nevertheless stating (p. 387):
11

. . . there was a preference in favor
of some of the creditors of the Brookings
Bank growing out of the transfers of the
currency and the collection items to the
Reserve Bank. The Reserve Bank participated
in those transfers. It received the
1 Nothing in the record suggests that Catron ordered First
Equity to act as agent; indeed, in two earlier orders, it acted
as principal. (R. 116).
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property transferred and it, in turn,
transferred it to the creditors of the
Brookings Bank. The action of the Reserve
Bank as agent helped bring about the
preference."
2.

Inland Waterways v. Hardee, 100 F.2d 678 (C.A.D.C.,

1938), reversed on other grounds, 309 U.S. 517:
"When an agent does some act which his principal
. . . could not authorize, he acts on his own
responsibility. No valid authority could have
been given the Corporation to exact an illegal
pledge; since it did exact such a pledge, it
is answerable for its tort without regard to
the status of its principals."
3.

Mayer v. Buchanan, 50 A.2d 595 (D.C., 1946).

sued defendant for collecting excessive rents.
he only collected rents as agent.

Plaintiff

Defendant argued

In ruling for plaintiff, the

court said, at p. 598:
"By contracting for the payment of rent above
the legal ceiling, defendant did an unlawful
act for which his principal could not have given
him valid authority. When an agent does something which his principal could not authorize,
he acts on his own responsibility. Nor is an
agent excused from liability in such a case because he acted only as agent." (emphasis added).
4.

Murphy v. Cady, 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me., 1939), affmd,

113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir., 1940).

A broker held to be "seller" under

sec. 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 whether acting as agent
only for seller or as dual agent for seller and buyer.

Accord are

Wilko v. Swan, 127 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y., 1955); and Boehm v.
Granger, 181 Misc. 680, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 246 (S. Ct., 1943).
These cases affirm that First Equity would be barred by the
"illegality of its own conduct" if the court applied Restatement
(2nc5 of Agency, §§ 439, 457, cited by amici on pp. 8-9 of their

briet."

They also attirm tnat tioggan v. uanoon, zo uian

444, 73 P. 542 (1903) is inapplicable because First Equity
was neither

innocent nor free from

negligence.

The maxim that one who deals with a public body does
so at his peril, so often expressed in ultra vires cases,
has no regard to whether the person so dealing acts as a principal or agent as determined by custom of the securities industry,
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY DENIED FIRST
EQUITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.

The Trial Court Properly Held That First Equityfs
Violation of Regulation T Constituted a Complete
Defense To The Claim For Damages On The AMS Stock
And To The Claim For Commissions On The Panelrama
Stock
After discussing USU's ultra vires defense, Judge

Christoffersen stated in his memorandum decision (R. 259):
• '"
This decision is also based on the fact
that the plaintiff cannot recover damages where
it did not deliver the securities purchased
within the time period provided in Regulation .
T of the Federal Reserve Board. The
plaintiff concedes that it did not deliver the
stocks within the 35-day period and concedes
that it would only be able to collect damages
for the amount by which the stock decreased in
value from the trade date until the expiration
of the 3.5-day delivery period of Regulation T,
and relies upon Billings Associates Inc. vs.
Bashaw, 27 AD 124, 276 New York Supplement
2nd 446. In reading the Billings case, this
court agrees that was the holding by the
Intermediate Appeals Court of New York State.

Amici conveniently omit to cite § 4 67 which bars an
agent from being indemnified by his principal where the agent
makes an illegal agreement with the principal to act for him.
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However, in reading Avery vs. Merrill, Lynch,
328 Federal Supplement 677, the court holds
and feels that this is a proper ruling, that
failure to deliver within the thirty-five
days is a full and complete, and valid defense in
a state court to attempt to collect damages."
It is not disputed that delivery of the 5,000 shares of
Advanced Memory Systems and the 24,100 shares of Panelrama Corporation was not made within 35 days from the date Catron ordered
the same.

The failure by appellant to deliver this stock within

that time constituted both a violation on its part of Regulation
T of the Federal Reserve Board and a breach by it of its
"contracts" with USU.
The legal consequence of appellant's failure to deliver
within 35 days from the purchase date is that USU was entitled
to refuse both to make payment for the Advanced Memory and to
pay the commission on the Panelrama stock.

This consequence flows

from each of USU ! s claims in defenses--first, that appellant
violated Regulation T independent of its contract with USU;
and second, that appellant breached its contract with USU because
it did not deliver within 35 days as required by the "margin requirements" (Regulation T) of the Federal Reserve Board.
The breach of contract consisted of not complying with
all the "rules, regulations, requirements (including margin requirements and customs of the Federal Board. . . (emphasis added) ",
to which the purchase contracts were made subject by the express
terms of the "conditions" appearing on the reverse side of the
written confirmation slip (prepared by First Equity) which
accompanied each purchase order.
-49-

(R. 272, 300).

Regulation T of the Federal Reserve Board is the regulation
which embodies the "margin requirements" referred to in
appellant's confirmation slip.
1.

USU was excused from paying because of First
Equity's breach of Regulation T.

First Equity has set forth the relevant provisions of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 193 4 and Regulation T
promulgated thereunder on pp. 37-39 of its brief.

All that

needs to be added is that USU maintained a special cash account
with First Equity (R. 275, 298). It is settled that a
customer may recover damages from a broker in a civil lawsuit
for violating Regulation T

and, a. fortiori, that a customer

may lawfully resist payment he would otherwise be obligated to
make where the broker has violated Regulation T.
In the leading case of Pearlstein v. Scudder, 429
F. 2d 1136 (2d Cir., 1970), plaintiff customer purchased some
bonds from defendant broker with which he maintained a special
cash account.

Payment of the balance due by the customer was

not made within seven business days of the trade date as
required by Regulation T.

However, the broker did not even

press for payment of this balance until several months later.
The customer never paid, whereupon the customer was sold out at
a substantial loss to him.

The customer then brought suit to
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recover from the broker the difference between what he would
have received had the broker sold the bonds to his account
promptly after payment was due and the amount he eventually
received when he was sold out much later.

In holding for the

customer, the court saidf at p. 1140:
"We...hold that Pearlstein has a right
of action against Scudder & German for
its violation of Section 7. Although the
congressional committee report which
recommended the enactment of Section 7
indicates that the protection of individual
investors was a purpose only incidental to
the protection of the overall economy from
excessive speculation, it has been recognized
in numerous cases since that time that
private actions by market investors are a
highly effective means of protecting the
economy as a whole from margin violations
by brokers and dealers (citing authorities)."
The broker had argued that the customer, Pearlstein, a knowledgeable investor

in addition to being a lawyer, should not be

allowed to benefit from the broker's illegal extension of credit,
especially if he knew of the illegality.
replied (at

To this the court

p. 1141):

"However, our holding does not turn on
Pearlstein!s subjective knowledge of the
law. In our view the danger of permitting
a windfall to an unscrupulous investor is
outweighed by the salutary policing effect
which the threat of private suits for
compensatory damages can have upon brokers
and dealers above and beyond the threats
of governmental action by the Securities
and Exchange Commission."
The broker had further argued that Pearlstein, having benefited
from the illegal extension of credit, was in pari delicto and

therefore could not recover.

This the court also dismissed,

saying (at p. 11.41) :
"...the federally imposed margin requirements
forbid a broker to extend undue credit but
do not forbid customers from accepting such
credit. This fact appears to indicate that
Congress has placed the responsibility for
observing margins on the broker, for the
original need for margin requirements undoubtedly derived from the common desire of
investors to speculate unwisely on credit.
Moreover, whereas brokers are charged by law
with knowledge of the margin requirements,
the extent of an investor's knowledge of
these rules would frequently be difficult of
tangible proof."
In Avery v. Merrill Lynch, 328 F. Supp., 677 (D.C. Dist.
Ct., 1971), the court followed the Pearlstein rationale under a
set of facts even harsher to the broker.

Defendant broker

sold some stock short for the customer, a sophisticated investor.

The transaction was conceded to be subject to the

margin requirements of Regulation T.

The customer had at

the time of the short sale $14,024.57 on deposit in her account
with the broker.
$22,999.23.

The proceeds from the short sale were

Since at the time the margin requirement was 65%,

the customer should have had in her account $14,949.69

to

cover the transaction, or $925.12 more than she actually had.
Under Regulation T, the customer had five business days to
come up with this needed amount; she did not do so within

this time.

One week after the deadline, the broker liquidated

the customer's short position at a loss to her of over $8,00.0.
Plaintiff then brought suit to have the whole transaction de-.
clared null and void by reason of the defendant's having waited
a week too long before liquidating.

In holding for the

plaintiff on her motion for summary judgment, the court, after
reviewing the legislative history behind Section 7, noted it
was disturbed by the customer's role in the transaction,
stating, at p. 681:
"The Court deplores this type of alleged
investor behavior and were not the mandate
of Congress so unequivocal and the public
policy considerations so strong, the Court
might reach a substantially different
decision than the one it does."
Both the Pearlstein and Avery cases involved customers
who successfully sued their brokers based on margin violations.
However, the reasoning of these cases applies a fortiori in the
instant case where USU did not receive the securities within the
35 day period allowed in a "delivery against payment" situation.
In both those cases, the broker apparently fulfilled his contractual obligation to the customer within the applicable period;
the party not fulfilling his contractual obligation was the
customer.

In the case at hand, the broker (First Equity) did

not deliver the certificates within 35 days.

Since USU did not

have to pay until the certificates arrived, and since it was
First Equity's responsibility to see that they were delivered
within 35 days, it is not unjust that USU should not have to

pay at all.

The equity of the customer not having to pay is

underscored by the fact that a broker is allowed to set up a
special cash account for a customer and conduct credit transactions for that customer when and only when the customer
"does not contemplate selling the security prior to making
such payment."

A customer,, in entering into a credit

transaction with a broker, realizes that the risk of the stock
declining in value between the trade date and the date of
payment falls squarely on him.

Since (1) he cannot resell the

stock until he has paid for it; (2) he is entitled to obtain
delivery before having to pay in a "delivery against payment"
situation; and (3) he knows that delivery must be made in
35 days f it is inequitable

to the customer to extend the

period of risk he has to bear beyond the 35 days, especially
in the case of stock, the value of which fluctuates so greatly.
Even absent the 3 5 day provision of the "delivery against
payment" situation existing in the subject lawsuit, courts have
held the principles of Pearlstein and Avery applicable to suits
brought by brokers to recover the amounts owed by their customers.
In Staley v. Salvesen, 35 District & County 2d

318 (Pa., 1963),

plaintiff broker purchased stock for the account of defendant
customer, then, after unsuccessfully attempting to obtain payment, sold it out at a loss long after 7 days and sued the customer
to recover the difference.

The Pennsylvania Court, in holding

for the customer based on the broker's violation of the margin
requirements, stated, at pp. 323-324:

"Regulation T is mandatory in character
and sales of securities to "special cash
accounts" which are not met by full
cash payment within the seven days
prescribed by section 4(c)(2) amount
to an extension of credit in violation
of the Regulation T and of section 7(c)
of the Securities Exchange Act (citation
omitted). So strong is this policy against
the unlawful extension and maintenance of
credit that the broker or dealer cannot
voluntarily accept payment after the seven
day period has passed as a substitution for
the cancellation or liquidation of the
transaction (citation omitted). And this is
so even when payment is offered promptly
after the period applicable to the transaction
(citation omitted). Payment beyond the prescribed seven-day period cannot be accepted
even where the delinquent has been pressed for
payment and where failure to apply to the
Committee on Business Conduct for an extension
of time was through inadvertence (citation
omitted) or where one extension has been
granted and a further extension has not been
requested before expiration of the first
(citation omitted)."
2.

Regulation T provides a complete defense.

In Avery, the court held that in light of the broker's
violation of Regulation T, the entire transaction came within
the ambit of Section 29 of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78 cc(b)) which provides in part:
"Every contract made in violation of any
provision of this chapter or any rule or
regulation thereunder, and every contract
(including any contract for listing a
security on an exchange) heretofore or
hereafter made, the performance of which
involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice
in violation of, any provision of this
chapter or any rule or regulation there-

^cc..

*

under, shall be void (1) as regards the
rights of any person who, in violation
of any such provision, rule or regulation,
shall have made or engaged in the performance of any such contract..
The court in Staley also relied on section 29(b) of the 1934
Act in holding that the violator broker could not recover

•

from the customer.
Judge Christofferson was eminently correct in following
Avery

in holding Regulation T to provide a complete and not

just a partial defense.
3.

USU was excused from paying plaintiff because in
not making delivery within 35 days, appellant
breached the purported contracts with USU.

First Equity's confirmation slips expressly made both
the Advanced Memory and Panelrama purchase transactions "subject to the rules, regulations, requirements (including margin
requirements) and customs of the Federal Reserve Board" and
the SEC.

These confirmation slips were prepared by First

Equity and the language quoted above appearing thereon is
stock language, adopted unilaterally and preceded by no
negotiations with USU or for that matter, with anybody.

In

other words, the confirmation slips are "contracts of adhesion."
It might be argued that notwithstanding the presence
of the aforequoted language on the confirmation slips, a
violation by First Equity of Regulation T does not constitute
a breach of the contract so as to allow USU to refuse payment;

but rather than said language was placed there to emphasize the
customerfs obligations under Regulation T.

Such a construction,

aside from its obvious one-sidedness in favor of the broker,
flies in the face of an accepted canon of statutory construction,
namely, that ambiguities caused by the draftsman of a contract
must be resolved against that party.

This canon has been said

to apply with particular force in the case of a contract of
adhesion.

Pacific Gas and Electric v. G.S. Thomas Drayage &

Rigging Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 203, 204 (Cal.Ct.App., 1967),
susperseded 69 Cal.Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641; Am. Jur. 2d
Contracts § 279, n. 6 (1973 Supplement).
B.

The Court Below Could Have Denied First Equity's
Motion For Summary Judgment on Other Defenses
of USU

Judge Christofferson concluded his memorandum decision
by stating:
"In view of the above rulings, the court
feels that it is unnecessary to comment on
further defenses of Utah State, such as the
First Security and Walker Bank and Trust
Company being agents of the plaintiff and their
knowledge that Catron had no authority to
purchase common stock as a defense. The court
feels that both have merit, but has indicated
in view of the previous rulings the court
feels further comment is unnecessary, . . . "
1.

USU was not obligated to pay because USU had withdrawn
from Catron any authority it had previously conferred
upon him

of which fact First Equity had notice.

USU submitted evidence (R. 310, 317) that on December
4, 1972, first the Utah State Board of Higher Education and then

the Investment Committee of USU f s Institutional Council told
Catron he should purchase no more common stock, but rather
should liquidate the portfolio USU then had.

Further, it

is not disputed that on or about December 15, 1972, articles
appeared in the Logan Herald Journal, Deseret News, and Salt
Lake Tribune, all of which reported that the Attorney General's
Office believed it was illegal for USU to purchase stock;
further , the Herald Journal article reported that the USU
Administration expressed its willingness to immediately make,
any required adjustments in the investment program to conform
with the official Attorney General!s opinion.

Likewise, it

is not disputed that the manager of First Security Bank
(which acted as the collecting bank for the purchase of the
Advanced Memory) read an article in the Herald Journal about
this time concerning what the Attorney General said about the
legality of USU's investment program.

Also the manager of

Walker Bank & Trust Co. (which served a similar role in
connection with the purchase of the other four stocks) has
stated without contradiction that he read an article about this
time in either the Herald Journal, the Tribune, or Deseret News
concerning the same subject.

(R. 326-328, 337-340, 353-356).

Therefore, a triable issue of fact has been raised as to
whether either First Security Bank or Walker Bank, or both of
them, had notice of enough facts prior to January 17, 1973,
to put them on inquiry as to whether Catron had authority to
purchase the five stocks in question.

This being so, if

I

either bank was an agent of First Equity, notice to that bank
of Catronfs lack of authority constituted notice to First
Equity.
a

*

Both First Security Bank and Walker Bank were
agents of First Equity

It is not necessary that USU contend that the banks
were agents only of First Equity as opposed to being dual
agents of plaintiff and USU.

3 Am. Jur. 2d, Agency, § 234.

USU contends alternatively (1) there is a triable issue of .
fact as to whether either bank was an agent of First Equity
(whether or not it was also an agent of USU), which for
purposes of defeating First Equity's motion below would
suffice; and (2) as a matter of law, both banks were agents
of First Equity with respect to the five purchases made by
Catron.
. i

(1)

• .

Statutory Scheme.

Section 7 0A-4-201(1), Utah Code, provides:
"Unless a contrary intent clearly appears and
prior to the time that a settlement given
by a collecting bank for an item is or
becomes final, the bank is an agent or
subagent of the owner of the item. . .
(emphasis added).11

The fact that Catron chose the banks does not preclude
them from being appellant's agents. 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency,
§§ 17-18; Restatement, Agency, 2d § 15.
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Section 7 0A-4-105id) states:
"Collecting bank" means any bank
handling the item for collection except the payor bank.11
Section 70A-4-104(1)(g), provides:
"Item" means any instrument for the
payment of money even though it is not '
negotiable but does not include money."
(2)

The banks were "Collecting Banks"

In Phelan v. University National Bank, 229 N.E. 2nd
374 (111., 1967), a factual situation identical to ours was
involved.

Plaintiff stock brokers had purchased stock on

behalf of a customer.

Payment was to be made against delivery.

Plaintiffs delivered the certificates to their bank for
collection which bank in turn forwarded them to defendant bank
for collection.

Defendant bank unsuccessfully attempted to

reach the customer to effect collection, then after some days
returned the certificates unpaid for to the plaintiff \s bank.
Plaintiffs sold the stock at a loss to themselves then sued
the defendant bank to recover the losses on the theory that it
was a payor bank under the Uniform Commercial Code and as
such had failed to give timely notice of the dishonor of
drafts drawn on the customer.

In holding for the defendant

bank, the court held that it was not a payor bank but rather a
collecting bank under th,e Commercial Code.

Examing the paper

work involved, the court noted that the plaintiffs therein had
their bank submit to defendant bank drafts for collection

which stated:

"To University Bank National Bank. . . a/c

Gerogia Barlas."; and that the transmittal letter of plaintifffs
bank to defendant bank stated:

"We enclose for collection

and remittance in Chicago funds only when actually paid."
The affidavits of Lawrence R. Anderson and Fred H.
Thompson, read in light of the Phelan case, clearly show that
the banks acted as collecting banks in the transactions constituting the subject matter of this lawsuit, and therefore
were agents for First Equity with respect to those transactions
according to the language of Section 70A-4-201(1).

The paper

work involved in the instant case is even identical to that in
Phelan (R. 3 05, 307).
(3)

The knowledge of the banks that there was some
question as to whether Catron was authorized to
purchase the stock constitutes notice to them
that he had no authority; such notice is
imputable to First Equity.

(a) What constitutes notice.
The Restatement of Agency 2d

states, in § 9(3):

"A person has notice of a fact if his
agent has knowledge of the fact, reason
to know it or should know it, or has
been given notification of it,under
circumstances coming within the rules
applying to the liability of a principal
because of notice to his agent, (emphasis
added)."
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Each of the managers of the banks read one of the newspaper
articles reporting that the Attorney General believed USU
had no authority to purchase stock.

It is not claimed here

that the articles gave actual notification to the banks of
Catronfs lack of authority.

USU does claim, however, that

the banks had reason to know or should have known, based on
the articles, of this fact.
(i)

Reason to Know.

Comment d to the above quoted section of the Restatment
reads:
"A person has reason to know of a fact
if he has information from which a person
of ordinary intelligence, or of the
superior intelligence which such person
may have, would infer that the fact in
question exists or that there is such
a substantial chance of its existence
that, if exercising reasonable care with
reference to the matter in question, his
action would be predicated upon the
assumption of its possible existence. . .
The words "reason to know1' do not necessarily
import the existence of a duty to others
to ascertain facts; the words are used both
where the actor has a duty to another and
where he would not be acting adequately in
the protection of his own interests were
he not to act with reference to the
facts which he has reason to know."
The bank managers had read that USU was believed to have no
authority to purchase stock.

A person of ordinary intelligence

would know that if this were true, Catron would have no
authority to purchase.

This being so, even though the banks

may not have owed a duty Lo First Equity to ascertain whether
or not Catron had authority (and this could easily have been
done by calling up the President or Financial Vice-President
of USU), the banks nevertheless did not act "adequately in
the protection of (their) own interests'1 since they did not
act "with reference to the facts which (they had) reason to
know f " i.e. they did not act as if Catron had no authority but
rather went ahead and collected for the stock certificates.
(ii)

Should Know.

Comment e to § 9 of the Restatement Agency, 2d reads:
"A person should know of a fact if a
person of ordinary prudence and intelligence. . . would ascertain in the performance of his duty to another, that such
facts exist or that there is such a
substantial chance of its existence that
his action would be predicated upon its
possible existence."
Persons of at least ordinary prudence and intelligence, like
the managers of banks, after having read the articles, should
have ascertained in the performance of their duties to First
Equity whether Catron did have authority to purchase; or at
least, there was such a substantial chance that he did not,
based on the articles,

that their actions should have been

predicated upon the possibility that he did not have authority.

Despite their reputation for inaccuracy, newspapers
generally do not carry a story without some basis. And although
the Attorney General's opinion may still be proven to be erroneous,
USU, as a state institution, had to be guided by it.; therefore
it had to revoke Catron's authority to purchase.

(b)

The effect upon his principal of knowledge
possessed by an agent,

§ 9(3) of the Restatement, Agency 2d, quoted above,
refers to the "rules

applying to the liability of a principal

because of notice to his agent."

Those rules are found in

§§ 272-283 (Topic 2, Chapter 8 ) . The general rule, stated
in § 272, reads:
" . . . subject to the rules stated in
this Topic, the liability of a principal
is affected by the knowledge of an
agent concerning a matter. . . upon
which it is his duty to give the principal
information."
The comment to § 27 2 makes it clear that the word "knowledge"
imports the definition of "notice" in § 9(3) .
In Hunt v. Smith, 25 Cal. App., 3d 807, 101 Cal.Rptr.
4, 11 (1972), a bank was serving as the collecting bank, and
thus agent of the defendant, to collect interest and principal
on a note owing defendant by plaintiff.

The court stated that

the knowledge of the collecting bank was imputed to its
principal, the defendant.
(c)

First Equity is affected by the knowledge that
Catron had no authority since the banks should
have acquired that knowledge.

Even if this Court holds as a matter of law that the
banks had no notice, actual or constructive, of Catron's lack

of authority, First Equity is affected by knowledge of that
fact under a separate principal of agency law.

Restatement

Agency 2d, § 277, points out that where the principal owes
a duty to others that care should be exercised in obtaining
information, knowledge which the agent should have acquired
in the performance of his duties is imputable to the principal.
In the case at hand, First Equity had a separate duty to USU
under ,Riles 746 and 747 of the Philadelphia, Baltimore and
Washington Exchange of which First Equity is a member (R. 6-10) .
Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir., 1969).
Those rules, and the duties they impose, appear as Appendix C.
(d) Conclusion.
As a matter of law, based on the above principles of
agency, the banks had "notice" of Catron's lack of authority
by virtue of their managers having read the articles. At the
very least, since the "notice" they had was not actual knowledge
but knowledge they had reason to possess, or should have
possessed, and since it is always a question of fact as to
whether one has reason to know, or should know, a particular
matter, a triable issue of fact existed to defeat First
Equity!s motion for summary judgment.
2.

There is a triable issue of fact as to whether
Catron had apparent authority when he ordered
each of the five stocks in question.

First Equity!s case appears to rest solely on the
theory that Catron had apparent authority which had not been
revoked when he ordered the five stocks.

This theory would be

stronger if it was certain that USU had sent a copy of the
corporate resolution dated January 20, 1972, to First Equity.
But as appears from the record, there is a considerable
factual dispute as to whether First Equity ever received a
copy (see pp. 10-11, supra). Thus there is atriable issue of
fact as to whether apparent authority was ever created in
Catron and if so, whether it was validly terminated.
(a)

Creation of apparent authority.

It is conceded that "if the agent properly begins
to deal with a third person and the principal has notice of
this, the apparent authority to conduct the transactions is
not terminated by the termination of the agent's authority
other than incapacity. . . unless the third person has notice
of it.11

Restatement, Agency 2d, § 129 (emphasis added).

But based on the facts of this case, summarized below, it is
at least a triable issue of fact whether both Catron had properly
begun to deal with First Equity and USU had notice of this.
The only purchase order Catron had placed with plaintiff
prior to December 4, when his authority was terminated (R. 309310, 317), was for 11,000 shares of Cunningham Arts; and that
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order had not been fully paid for as of December 4th. (R. 303).
Further, no one in the USU hierarchy above Catron knew that
he had placed orders with plaintiff until long after December
4th. (R. 311-312).
(b)

USU f s duty to inquire.

In Tintic Delaware Mining v. Salt Lake F. & K. R. Co.,
59 Utah 437, 203 P. 871 (1921), third party creditors sued
defendant railroad company and some of its directors.

The

suit against the directors proceeded on the theory that they
were responsible for the corporation's officers having diverted
from the corporation in breach of a contract between plaintiff
and the corporation funds in which plaintiff had an interest.
Plaintiff conceded that the directors knew nothing about the
contract or the diversion of funds in breach thereof but
apparently urged liability on their part based on an alleged
duty to plaintiff to oversee

the funds which were diverted

and alleged violation of that duty.

In upholding a judgment

for the directors, the Supreme Court treated the questions
as one of fact and found that the record supported the lower
court's findings.

It is thus a question of fact as to whether

USU had a duty to inquire as to which brokers Catron had been
dealing with and, if so, whether it breached that duty.

See

also the discussion on what constitutes constructive notice
on pp. 61-63

above.

,
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(c)

Termination of apparent authority.

. There is a further reason why First Equityfs theory
based on apparent authority must fail.

Section 129 of

Restatement, Agency 2d , quoted above, points out that the
apparent authority of Catron could be terminated without
notice being received by plaintiff if the cause of termination
was the "incapacity" of Catron.

As discussed on pp.

68-71

r

infra, it is at least triable whether Catron possessed authority
from USU after December 5th and, therefore, on principles
of municipal law, was incapable of contracting with First
Equity thereafter.
4.

USU Has No Legal Obligation To First Equity
Under Contracts Which Catron Had No Authority
From USU to Make.

A separate defense, not commented on by Judge Christofferson, is that even conceding USU had statutory power to authorize
Catron to purchase stock, USU incurred no legal liability
if in fact it did not authorize him to do so.

The affidavit of

Dee A. Broadbent attests that Catron1s authority from the
Institutional Council to purchase stocks had been withdrawn
prior to the dates he ordered the stock in question. (R. 310,317).
If this is true (First Equity appears to deny this, but at
least a triable issue of fact is raised), USU is not liable
on the contracts Catron purported to make with First Equity
since .ordinary agency law notwithstanding, USU is not estopped
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from denying the authority of Catron to purchase stock after
December 4, 197 2.

In 10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,

(1966 Rev. Vol.) § 29.104c, p. 517, it is stated:
"Although in some instances a contrary view has been taken, ordinarily
a municipality will not be estopped
to deny the authority of one of its
officers to make a contract, and the

fact that the same officer had previously made contracts which the
municipal:Lty had recognized as binding
does not estop it from deny:m g his
authority in the particular "instance.
(emphasis added)."
McQuillin cites 22 cases from 17 jurisdictions in support of the
rule that "ordinarily a municipality will not be estopped to
deny the authority of one of its officers to make a contract."
Utah is in accord with the general rule.

In Petty v. Borg, 106

Utah 524, 150 P.2d 776 (1944), a procurement officer, who was
authorized to purchase automobilies for the federal government,
ordered four station wagons from plaintiff dealer.
ment paid plaintiff for these.

The govern-

However, the officer also ordered

a fifth wagon, ostensibly on behalf of the government, but in
reality for a friend, Borg.

On the officer's instructions,

plaintiff delivered the vehicle to Borg, thinking he was
authorized to receive it on behalf of the government.

When

the government refused payment on this wagon (Borg had paid the
officer who then fled with the proceeds), plaintiff sued Borg
for claim and delivery of the vehicle.

Borg, in arguing that

title had passed to him, urged that the government was estopped
from denying that the officer had authority to sell it to him.
In rejecting this, the court stated

(p. 780):

: ". . . the government is not bound
or estopped by the acts of its officers or
agents which are not within the scope of
their authority so the doctrine of
estoppel is of no aid to the defendant
here."
In Tooele City v. Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 493-495,
Justice Wolfe states, concurring:

<

"I do not know whether the statement that
individuals dealing with officers should
be able to rely upon their acts; that
officers should act within the authority
granted; and that officers should be held
to their acts * * * like individuals1 is
. intended to be a statement of moral responsibility or enunciate a legal principle,
or whether it means that a municipality whose
officers act or promise should be held for
the acts o f those officers, like individuals.
If these expressions are meant to enunciate
legal principles, I call attention to the
following: Missouri v. Bank of Missouri,
45 Mo. 528; Pierce v. United States, 7 Wall,
666, 19 L.Ed. 169; McQuillin on Municipal
Corporations, (2nd Ed.) Sec. 519, Page 192;
Mecham on Public Offices, Sees. 511 and 512,
P. 336; Wormstead v. City of Lynn, 184 Mass.
425, 68 N.E. 841; Higginson v. City of Fall
River, 226 Mass. 423, 115 N.E. 764, 2 A.L.
R. 1209; City of Enterprise v. J. Rawls, 204,
Ala. 528, 86 So. 374, 11 A.L.R. 1175. These .
authorities discuss the duty of an individual
in dealing with an officer or agent of a city,
to determine whether he is acting strictly within
his authority. The principle of 'holding
out1 does not apply to a municipality. A city
may be estopped from asserting a claim because
of the action or non-action of its representative
body or successive bodies under certain circumstances, but neither that body nor the city
is estopped or bound in any way on the theory
that it has held out its agent as having
authority which he did not have.11
Wormstead v. City of Lynn, cited by Justice Wolfe, supra, saw
the court assume

that the agent in question had entered the

same type of contract on prior occasions and the city had
paid the contractor pursuant thereto.

The court then said,

at pp. 842-843:
"The other contention of the plaintiff
is that the defendant city has held out the
superintendent of streets as one having
authority to contract, and is estopped to
deny that authority as against the plaintiff,
who has acted on the faith of the practice
which the city has allowed . . . . the
decisive answer to the whole contention is
that the doctrine relied on by him has
no application where a person enters into
a contract with a public officer who undertakes to act for and to bind a municipal
corporation or other body politic. Such
a person is bound, at his peril, to ascertain the extent of the authority of the
public officer with whom he deals. In such
a case the money pledged for the payment of the
contractor is the money of the public, or of
an ascertained portion of the public; and
the public is not estopped by a violation of
duty on the part of public officials, no
matter how many officials may have been
concerned in it, and no flatter how long it
may have continued/"
("eniphas"is added).
4.

Even Assuming, Arguendo, USU had Power to Purchase
Stock with its Grant Monies, Judge Christofferson's
Orders Should be Affirmed Because There was no
Such Money Available to USU to Purchase the Five
Stocks in Question.

Assuming that not all of the sources comprising the
investment pool were unavailable legally for purchasing stock,
but that grant monies (i.e. those defined in § 53-32-4) could
be lawfully used for this purpose, this court as a matter of

law should hold that the uninvested cash in the investment
pool at the time Catron placed orders for the stock in question
was grant money only in the event and to the extent that the
total amount which at that time was already invested in stock
was less than the total amount contributed (to the pool from
grant sources. By this method of computation, which is
compelled by the law concerning what money can be invested
by USU in what securities, Judge Christofferson1s two orders
should be affirmed as a matter of law since at the time Catron
ordered the stocks in question from First Equity, it is not
disputed that USU already had an amount invested in stock
over ten times as great as the total amount of its grant funds
(R. 310-311).
It has been argued, however, that inasmuch as all USU's
monies had been placed in a common investment pool, it is
impossible to trace the monies present in the pool at a given
time to a particular source and therefore this court should
treat the amount of cash left in the pool at any given time
as being grant monies.

This argument is faulty for the reason

it disregards sound accounting principles of pooling which would
allocate any money left in the pool at any given time to the
various sources of origin in proportion to the amount contributed to the pool from the various sources.

CONCLUSION
The Order, below, granting USU's Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment should be affirmed on the grounds, each and
all:
1.

USU had no statutory power to purchase stock with

any funds in its custody;
2.

First Equityfs own violation of Regulation T

is a complete defense to its claim for losses suffered on the
AMS stock and its claim for commissions on the Panelrama stock;
with respect to the claim for commissions on the other three
stocks (Natomas, Great Basin Petroleum, and Cordura), the
voluntary cancellation by First Equity of Catron's orders to
purchase these stocks (as well as the order to buy Panelrama)
constituted a relinquishment of its right to receive commissions;
3.

As a matter of law, Catron had no authority from

USU to purchase the stock in question, his authority having
been revoked prior to his placing orders to buy the same;
4.

As a matter of law, First Equity had notice of the

revocation of Catron's authority prior to accepting the five
orders; and
5.

As a matter of law, USU did not have available at the

time Catron placed the five orders grant monies sufficient to
pay for the same.
The Order below denying First Equity's Motion for Summary
Judgment should be affirmed on one or more of the above
five grounds in addition to the grounds, each and all:

1.

If any funds in USUfs custody could be used

legally to purchase stock, a triable issue remains as to
whether at the time the five orders were placed such funds
were available to USU sufficient to pay for said orders;
2.

There is a triable issue of fact as to whether

Catron's authority to purchase stock was revoked; and
3.

There is a triable issue of fact as to whether

First Equity acquired notice of the revocation of Catron!s
authority.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. RGMNEY
Attorney General
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The Language of the 1888 Act Establishing
USU Refutes the Argument that the Territorial
Legislature Conferred Power to Invest in Stock
In examing the above argument, the court should consider the principles of statutory construction set forth on
pp. 18-22

of respondent's brief and in particular, (1) the common

law presumption that public bodies may not acquire property or
spend money for investment or speculation and (2) the canon that
courts strictly construe the powers of a public body where the
powers are said to include the power to contract for products
or services other than those customarily required by public
bodies.

Applying the principles

of construction referred to,

it is obvious that the 18 8 8 Act in no way conferred on the
school the power to invest in stock or corporate bonds.

The

relevant sections are set forth below (emphasis has been added):
s. 2. For the purpose of erecting suitable school buildings and purchasing land on
which to conduct agricultural experiments, the
sum of twenty-five thousand dollars, or so much
thereof as is necessary, is hereby appropriated
out of any money in the Territorial treasury not
otherwise appropriated.
*

*

*

s. 4. The trustees shall elect one of
their number a president, and shall appoint a
superintendent, a secretary, and treasurer.
Said trustees shall take charge of the general
interests of the institution, and shall have
power to enact by-laws and rules for the regulation of all its concerns, not inconsistent with
the laws of the Territory. They shall have the
general control and supervision of the agricul-

Appendix A(l)

tural college, the farm pertaining thereto, and
such lands as may be vested in the college by
Territorial legislation, of all appropriations
made by the Territory for the support of the
same, and also of lands that may hereafter be
donated by the Territory, or the United States,
or by any person or corporation, in trust for
the promotion of agricultural and industrial
pursuits. . ..."
*

*

*

s. 3. The trustees shall have supervision
of the erection of the college buildings, and
shall make all purchases and contracts for said
buildings in accordance with such plans, drawings and specifications as the said trustees
shall have adopted. They shall, in all contracts
entered into, require bonds to be given for the
faithful performance of the same, and shall keep
an accurate record of their proceedings, which
shall embrace copies of all contracts entered
into, and a minute and accurate record of all
expenditures,showing the amount paid, to whom
paid, and for what service rendered, and materials purchased, and whether paid on account or
in performance of contract; and for all payments
made,vouchers shall be taken. .
*

*

*

s. 6. The trustees shall make a report to
the next general Assembly of the Legislature,
showing the amount of work done, the condition
of the buildings, a detailed account of the
expenditures on the same, the amount of land
bought, its cost and condition, and the improvements
thereon."
The initial appropriation to USU of $25,000 was to be used only
11

for the purpose of erecting suitable school buildings and

purchasing lands on which to conduct agricultural experiments."
Section 2, supra.

The only section of the Act mentioning powers

to contract is Section 5.

By that section, the trustees were

given specific powers to supervise the erection of college
buildings, to adopt plans, drawings and specifications for
those buildings, and to make all purchases and contracts for
the buildings.

Finally, Section. 6 specifies that the report
Appendix A(2)

which the trustees must make to the Legislature periodically
shall show the amount of work done on the buildings, their
conditions, an accounting of money expended on the buildings,
and comparable information on land purchased, i.e., amount,
cost, condition, and improvements.
The logical consequences of construing the words
"general control and supervision. . . of all appropriations"
to include power to invest in stock are that those same words
must then be construed to grant USU power to invest or speculate
in anything whatsoever.

This fatal flaw in defendants1 argu-

ment has been noted by Judge Aldon Anderson in his opinion in
Utah State University vs. duPont Walston, Inc., October 1,
1974, CCH Fed. Sec. Law Rptr. p 94,812.X
Inasmuch as the initial appropriation over which the
trustees had "general control and supervision" was to be used
only for buildings and lands, it is inconceivable that the
Legislature intended that the trustees should have power to
invest or speculate in anything.

That the legislature did not

intend to grant such a dangerous power is evidenced by the
facts (1) that the only section of the Act which confers
specific powers to contract limits those powers to cont-

"The Court is equally concerned with the amicus curiae
theory that would give state universities a free hand in all
investment matters."

Appendix A(3)

tracts connected with the erection of college buildings;
and (2) that the only information the trustees must include
in their report to the Legislature involves buildings and
land.
This court can take judicial notice of the risk
involved in investing in stock in many if not most companies
in 1888, let alone in investing in other forms of speculation,
Yet, if appellant's argument is accepted, the Legislature
gave USU's trustees a carte blanche to invest appropriated
monies in anything.

Such a contention is unworthy of belief.

Indeed, applying the general principles of public law
discussed at pp. 18-22 , supra, the only powers to contract
which the 18 88 Act conferred are found in Section 5. The
language of sec. 4, relied on by appellant , gave no power to
contract, but only the power to audit and otherwise supervise
the spending of appropriated monies.
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TITLE OF S.B. 15 8, LAWS OF UTAH 193 9
(enacting §§ 33-1-1 and 33-1-3)
An Act Authorizing Insurance Companies,
Financial Institutions, State, County, and
Municipal Administrative Departments,
Boards, Commissions and Officers, Mutual
Benevolent and Benefit Associations, Firemen's Relief and Pension Fund, Police Pension Fund and Other Pension Funds, Building
and Loan Associations, Charitable, Educational,
Eleemosynary and Public Corporations and
Organizations to Invest in Bonds Issued by
the United States, Bonds for the Payment of
Whose Principal and Interest Is Guaranteed
by the United States or Bonds or Debentures
of Certain Instrumentalities of the Federal
Government and the Insured Shares or Accounts
of Domestic Building and Loan Associations or
Federal Savings and Loan Associations, and
Providing That Such Securities Shall Be
Acceptable As Security for Bonds and as a
Deposit for Securities When Required by Law.

PHILADELPHIA-BALTIMOREWASHINGTON STOCK EXCHANGE
RULES
RULE 747.
No member organization shall make any brokerage
transactions for the account of a customer unless, prior to the
completion thereof, a general partner or an officer who is a
holder of voting stock in such organization shall have specifica
approved the opening of such account, provided, however, that
in the case of branch offices the opening of an account for a
customer may be approved by the manager of such branch office
but the action of such branch office manager shall within a
reasonable time be approved by a general partner or an officer
who is a holder of voting stock in such organization.

The

member, general partner or officer approving the opening of an
account shall, prior to giving his approval, be personally
informed as to the essential facts relative to the customer
and to the nature of the proposed account and shall indicate
his approval in writing on a document which will become part
of the records of his office or organization.
RULE 746.
Every member is required either personally or through a
general partner or an officer who is a holder of voting stock in
his organization to use due diligence to learn the essential fac
relative to every customer and to every order or account accepte
by his organization.
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